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Society’s growing interest in national defence and service in the Lithuanian Armed Forces, demonstrates that defence issues are important to our citizens. With this White Paper, we seek to present Lithuania’s defence policy not only to defence and military experts but also to the whole of society. We think that it is important to discuss widely why a particular defence policy is implemented, what our goals are and what tasks are still waiting to be accomplished in the area of national defence.

During the last ten years, Lithuania’s security environment has changed beyond recognition. During this time we encountered the use of military power against Georgia and Ukraine. Moreover, Russian military activities have grown in size and scope near our borders as well. Russia demonstrates its ability to use military and non-military means simultaneously, continuous information attacks are observed in our information space and the threat of cyber-attacks is as acute as never before. In addition, the security problems in the Southern neighbourhood of Europe, such as terrorism, flows of illegal migration and humanitarian crises have a direct and indirect negative impact on Lithuania’s security. These security challenges led to the revision of the directions and priorities of Lithuania’s defence policy.

While reacting to the changes in the security environment, the highest priority is given to the strengthening of national defence capabilities. The Lithuanian Armed Forces have to be prepared to rapidly and properly respond to the rising threats. The growing defence budget allows us to better develop and modernise the capabilities of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. We have to continue to develop two Land Force brigades, expand the necessary infrastructure and improve the conscription system. And these are only few of the important tasks in strengthening national defence.

In this unpredictable security environment, the importance of NATO and the transatlantic partnership with the U.S. has grown. The presence of Allies’ forces in Lithuania contributes to the credible deterrence and demonstrates the solidarity of NATO. At the same time, the Lithuanian military contributes to international security by participating in international operations and missions in various regions around the world.

As the nature of threats we face changes, preparedness of society, its will, and resolve to defend the country, acquire a greater significance. With this in mind, we have put efforts to strengthen the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union and to provide opportunities for citizens to acquire military and nonviolent resistance skills and knowledge as well as to educate society in recognising information attacks. No less an important task is to increase cyber security. The uniting idea of all these elements is the notion that only together, military, civil institutions and society, can we ensure our comprehensive security.

This new White Paper on Lithuania’s defence policy offers a possibility to take a closer look at the directions of Lithuania’s defence policy, changes in the Lithuanian Armed Forces and the ways we intend to strengthen the state and society’s preparedness for defence.

Minister of National Defence Raimundas Karoblis
1. LONG-TERM CHALLENGES TO LITHUANIA’S SECURITY

Membership in NATO and the EU is the basis of Lithuania’s defence policy; therefore the security of Lithuania depends on the successful development of these organisations. The project of a united Europe faces various challenges: Brexit, tensions in the Eurozone, different responses of EU members to the flows of illegal migration, the growing threat of home-grown terrorism, and the rising of anti-EU attitudes, to name just a few. NATO has made decisions to strengthening collective defence and deterrence; however, the remaining gap between the defence spending of the U.S. and the European Allies is a political issue on the U.S. internal policy agenda and raises tensions in the Euro-Atlantic community. In this context, three main challenges have emerged, which will impact Lithuania’s security, not only in the short-term but also in the longer-term perspective.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The long-term challenges to Lithuania’s security</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Russian revisionism</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Information and cyber threats</td>
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<td>3. Threats rising in NATO’s Southern neighbourhood</td>
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The first and foremost challenge is Russia’s dissatisfaction with the international order established after the Cold War, and its ambition to regain its status as a major power while violating international norms and disrupting the rules-based European security system.

Russia’s foreign and security policy is characterised by its growing aggressiveness as more and more significance is given to the use of military power to reach its goals. By using military force against Georgia and Ukraine, Russia severely violated the sovereignty and territorial integrity of these countries. The annexation of Crimea was the first time after the Cold War when one European country added the territory of another state to its own, by force. With this act, Russia showed that it does not respect the rights of other countries to independently choose the way to develop their own security. It also demonstrated its readiness to use all available means to dismantle the architecture of Euro-Atlantic security. Russia’s capacity to use civil (economic and energy blackmail, political corruption, cyber-attacks, information operations, etc.) and military means in a very coordinated manner so as to conduct covert operations, raises a particularly great concern.

The growing Russian military capabilities are also more worrisome as a large share of Russia’s defence expenditures is allocated to the reform and rearmament of its Armed Forces with the priority given to the manning and equipping of their permanent readiness units. In fact, Russia’s military modernisation is largely concentrated in the Western Military District, including the Kaliningrad Region.

Russia is rapidly developing Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) capabilities in Crimea, the Kola Peninsula and Kaliningrad Region. In the Kaliningrad region, which borders Lithuania, Russia is building up its air defence, missile, artillery, coastal defence, naval and radio-electronic capabilities, which in case of military conflict, could block NATO reinforcement coming into the Baltic
states by sea and air routes or by the narrow land strip on the border of Lithuania and Poland. For example, in the Kaliningrad region, Russia has deployed the S-300V and S-400 air defence systems which are capable to destroy air targets, like aircraft and ballistic missiles, with a range of 100 and 400 km respectively. With these actions, Russia aims to deter NATO from implementing its collective defence commitments as well as prevent Allied military support in case of Russian aggression.

In the vicinity of Lithuania and other NATO countries, Russia regularly conducts snap combat readiness checks which are lacking in transparency, during which large number of troops are activated to test their abilities to conduct long-range deployments, joint operations and actions in unfamiliar environments.

The security situation is further aggravated by Russia’s unilateral withdrawal from various arms control initiatives which promote mutual transparency and trust. In 2008, after declaring a moratorium on its involvement in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Russia stopped the exchange of information among the participants of the Treaty. In 2014, Russia unilaterally terminated the 2001 bilateral Lithuanian-Russian agreement, on Additional Confidence and Security Building Measures. The agreement was dedicated to strengthening regional security and stability, and building trust between the two countries and their armed forces. The growing Russian military activities near the borders of Lithuania and other NATO countries, as well as Russia’s withdrawal from the various agreements on confidence and security building measures, only increases the possibility for various incidents to occur, while the security situation in the region becomes even less predictable. This type of military activity is regularly used by Russia to test the security level of the Baltic states’ airspace or impede shipping in Lithuania’s Exclusive Economic Zone.
Close Russian military cooperation with Belarus, also strengthens Russia’s power in the region. Belarus’ defence and security policy is closely coordinated with Russia, and military integration of both states is practically completed – their armed forces are fully interoperable, the command and control of the Russia-Belarus Regional Group of Forces is synchronised, their joint air defence system continues to be further developed, and joint military exercises are frequently organised and conducted.

As a result of all these factors, Lithuania’s security environment has worsened and this threat to the country’s security will remain a longstanding issue. The likelihood of military aggression is no longer a theoretical possibility but one where military and non-military measures could be used in combination, in order to exploit the vulnerabilities of the state.

The second long-term challenge to Lithuania’s security is information and cyber-attacks. As Lithuania is increasingly dependent on modern communication and information technologies, cyber-attacks against the networks of state institutions, state defence system, business entities or media, constitute a growing threat to national security. Cyberattacks are organised by certain states or state supported entities, and with the potential to further grow on a larger scale – by non-state actors or even by individuals. It is highly likely that cyber capabilities would be extensively used during any type of conventional or unconventional conflict in the region so as to impede the response of Lithuania and Allies. In this light, security of critical infrastructure, necessary for the functioning of vital sectors of the nation, become especially relevant.

Propaganda, disinformation and other deliberate information attacks is a growing threat to modern societies, as certain states and non-state actors increasingly use the information space domain in order to disrupt the democratic process in other countries, escalate tensions among their citizens or encourage distrust in state institutions and states themselves. In Lithuania and other states in the region, Russia aggressively spreads unfounded and misleading information with the aim of shaping public opinion on the questions of national security. In the future, the number of information attacks, particularly those directed towards specific target groups, is likely to grow as a result of the increase use of information and communications technologies.

The third important challenge is religious extremism and the protracted conflicts in the Southern neighbourhood of Europe. Failed political and social reforms in some Middle East and North African countries has led to conflicts, which not only caused the spread of terrorism, large scale illegal migration, organised crime and humanitarian crises, but also has raised a serious challenge to the solidarity and integration of the EU as a whole.

Militant Islamist groups intensively use various propaganda tools to radicalise Muslims in Europe, who later travel to fight in their ranks in the Middle East and North Africa or organise terrorist attacks in Europe. The instability in this region has spurred massive migration to Europe, which, in addition to economic and social challenges to European countries, has created more opportunities for terrorist organisations to send terrorists to Europe. Although the possibility of a terrorist attack in Lithuania remains low, the growing threat of terrorism in Europe, the spread of radical Islamic ideology, the return of EU states’ radicalised citizens from conflict regions, and the creation of independent local terrorists cells in European countries, have an indirect and negative influence to the security of Lithuania.
2. LITHUANIA’S DEFENCE POLICY IN A CHANGED SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

2.1. The main pillars of Lithuania’s defence policy

The main goal of Lithuania’s defence policy remains unchanged – to ensure a credible defence of Lithuanian independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order. In addition, being a NATO and EU member, Lithuania, together with its Allies, has a responsibility for the security of the Euro-Atlantic space and contributing to international security and stability. Taking into account the long-term challenges to Lithuania’s security and its international commitments, Lithuania’s defence policy has four main pillars.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main pillars of Lithuania’s defence policy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strengthening of national defence capabilities</td>
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<td>2. Strengthening of NATO collective defence and deterrence</td>
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<td>3. Strengthening of civil and state preparedness for military and non-military threats</td>
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The first and most important pillar of Lithuania’s defence policy is the strengthening of its national defence capabilities, which are based on the Lithuanian Armed Forces (LAF). The LAF, together with its Allies, must be prepared to deter or, if deterrence fails, to defend Lithuania individually and together with Allies. Russia’s aggression against Georgia and the Ukraine and its attempts to undermine the rules-based security architecture in Europe means that existential threats to Lithuania’s security remain and that a response to these threats should be the foundation of the Lithuanian defence policy.

Total and unconditional defence is the main principle of Lithuanian defence meaning that all national resources will be used to defend the State and that every citizen and the entire nation will resist in every way defined as legitimate by international law. Defence of Lithuania is not a subject to any conditions, and no one can inhibit the right of the nation and every citizen to resist an aggressor. Lithuania will defend its sovereignty and resist all aggression independently and without waiting until Allied support is provided.

Analysis of the conflicts in Georgia and the Ukraine shows Russia’s advanced development of A2/AD capabilities, and its capability to use covert military tactics, as well as a constant presence of very high readiness military capabilities close to Lithuania borders, allows one to make an assump-
tion that a military conflict would be sudden, with a very short early warning period. Due to these reasons, response times would be the most important factor in case of regional military conflict.

Lithuania must develop national defence capabilities which are sufficient for national defence, with the objective ability to fight until Allied reinforcements are in place. In modern conflicts, the ability to react needs to be evaluated in hours and days, not in weeks or months, so certain LAF units must be on high readiness, capable to respond to both conventional military threats and covert military type actions like irregular armed groups. Accordingly, the peacetime structure of the LAF has to be similar to the wartime structure in order to ensure the most effective preparation and fastest possible response to aggression.

Collective and individual defence is an important principle of Lithuanian defence meaning that Lithuania has to develop national defence capabilities for individual national defence and for the collective defence with the Allies for the defence of Lithuania or any other Ally.

Lithuania has to develop an armed forces’ reserve, which corresponds to the needs of Lithuanian defence, is properly prepared and equipped, capable to fully man military units in case of a crisis and able to sustain the fighting capability of the LAF during long-term aggression.

Development and Modernisation of the Lithuanian Armed Forces

Rapid Reaction

Prepared Reserve

In the case of aggression, Lithuania would be defended by the wartime armed forces which include not only the LAF but also capabilities of other institutions as defined by Lithuanian laws. As such, the strengthening of the armed forces’ preparedness and interoperability is one of the top priorities.

The transatlantic partnership with the U.S. and its military presence in Europe, is the backbone of the NATO’s collective defence system. A strong and coherent Alliance, capable to secure and defend its members, is an essential guarantee of Lithuania’s security. Therefore, the strengthening of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence is one of the cornerstones of Lithuania’s defence policy.

Taking into account the very short warning time of a possible conflict, NATO’s military presence in the region is fundamental for a credible deterrence. In addition, a rapid NATO response, together with reinforcements during a crisis, would need to follow in case of conflict. As a member of the Alliance, Lithuania also has to be ready to appropriately contribute to the security and defence of other Allies.

The third pillar of the Lithuanian defence policy is the strengthening of civil and state preparedness for military and non-military threats. A civic and patriotic society, determined to defend its country and possessing the necessary skills and knowledge on how to do it, is one of the strongest
guarantees for any nation's independence. To deepen society's involvement in the defence of the country, the Lithuanian Riflemen's Union (LRU), a voluntary civil defence organisation has to be strengthened. In response to non-military threats, it is necessary, through the joint efforts of society and state institutions, to increase the nation's resilience to cyber and information threats. For this reason, Lithuania has to further improve its national cyber security system as well as continue its large scale public education campaign on recognising and deconstructing propaganda, disinformation, and other information attacks. The improvement of mobilisation and the Host Nation Support systems are considered essential tasks required to ensure an effective response of the whole state in case of crisis or armed aggression. A successful response to all these challenges depends on the combined efforts of society, the Ministry of National Defence, the Lithuanian Armed Forces and other institutions.

The fourth pillar of Lithuania's defence policy is the contribution to regional and international security with the aim of shaping Lithuania's, as well as the NATO and EU security environment. Bilateral and multilateral military cooperation with the U.S., Nordic and Baltic countries, Poland, Germany and other Allies is a key instrument in developing Lithuanian defence capabilities and capacities for common efforts, as well as increasing regional and international security. Lithuania supports the reforms of the security and defence sector in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which promotes democratic and European values and brings these states closer to the Euro-Atlantic community.

To promote stability beyond NATO and EU borders, Lithuania has to be prepared to continue to actively participate in international operations of NATO, the EU as well as other international organisations, in order to contribute to the fight against terrorism and other security issues. Contributing to international operations not only demonstrates solidarity with other NATO and EU members but it also directly and indirectly increases Lithuania's security in the globalised world.

2.2. Defence budget growth

The size of the defence budget is based on three main factors: threat assessment, political will and economic capacity of the state. At the time Lithuania became a member of NATO and the EU, its security environment was deemed stable and the most secure since regaining independence. Consequently, even with periods of economic growth, the rate at which the defence budget was increased was not sufficient: in absolute terms, defence funding was growing but as a percent of GDP, it was decreasing. As the threat perception began to change, taking into account Russia's growing military capabilities and outward demonstration of its military power, as well as its aggression against Georgia in 2008, Lithuania began to adjust its defence policy priorities based on the changing security environment. However, a more significant increase in the defence budget was precluded due to the 2009 global financial crisis.
The optimal defence budget: NATO standards

3% of GDP  The standard for defence funding during the Cold War.

The average  After the Cold War, the average of the Allies’ defence budgets, which was more than 2% of GDP in the nineties, was used as a guide. The particular percentage was recalculated periodically.

2% of GDP  In 2006, the guidance for Allies to spend 2% of GDP, which reflected the “statistical” average of NATO member states defence budgets, was agreed upon. It is the current NATO standard. This standard was also based on the practical experience of Allies. A defence budget of this size was assessed as sufficient not only to maintain capabilities but also to modernise armed forces as well as fulfil international obligations.

?  Changes in the security landscape raises several questions on whether allocating 2% of GDP to defence budgets is sufficient for those states which face significantly increased threats or for those nations which have to focus additional attention to rebuilding their capabilities after undergoing a long-term period of insufficient defence funding.

As the security situation in the region continued to deteriorate, it became clear that the insufficient level of defence funding in Lithuania was a serious obstacle to a credible deterrence and defence. In 2014, reacting to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, Lithuania immediately started to increase its defence budget. Overall, in the period from 2014-2017, the allocations to defence more than doubled, putting Lithuania among the top ten Allies when looking at defence spending increases. Furthermore, it is planned to reach 2.06% of GDP by 2018. This rapid growth of defence expenditures allows Lithuania to significantly increase its national defence capabilities as well as send a strong unified message to Allies that it understands its commitments. These increased defence outlays also demonstrates Lithuania’s posture towards its own defence, sending a clear and unambiguous message to any potential aggressor. Moreover, 2% of GDP for defence has to be considered as the minimum funding level necessary to develop the capabilities needed to respond...
to Lithuania’s security challenges, thus a political agreement on the future increase of defence expenditures will be sought.

The distribution of defence spending is planned according to NATO standards: no less than 20% allocated for the procurement of armament and military equipment, and no more than 50% for personnel. In 2016, Lithuania modernisation investments were the largest within the Alliance.

Starting from the beginning of 2018, National Defence System procurements will be centralised into a new defence resource agency which will be responsible for the management and procurement of armament and other projects, with the goal of making defence spending as transparent and effective as possible.
3. LITHUANIA’S INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE POLICY

3.1. The strengthening of NATO’s collective defence and deterrence

NATO’s fundamental purpose is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means. In order to achieve this, the Alliance is fulfilling three core tasks – collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. The foundation of the Alliance and its raison d’être is Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty which states, that an armed attack against one or several NATO members in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all. The strengthening of NATO’s crisis management capabilities and cooperation with partners complements the collective defence dimension. All three core tasks provide the basis for the 360 degree security concept, expressing solidarity while reacting to the threats coming from the East and the South.

NATO, as a collective defence Alliance, focuses on credible deterrence, which is based on the appropriate mix of conventional, nuclear and missile defence capabilities. At the 2014 Wales and 2016 Warsaw Summits, the decisions to strengthen deterrence and defence in the Eastern flank of the Alliance were taken and guidelines for the long-term NATO adaptation to the changing security environment were agreed upon. These moves implement the long-term goal of Lithuania – to reinforce NATO security guarantees with practical political and military measures. In this context, Lithuania has three main priorities in the strengthening of NATO collective defence and deterrence:

1. NATO military presence in the region

NATO military presence and visibility in the region is the most effective way to demonstrate the solidarity of the Allies and ensure a credible deterrence. Lithuania’s goal is the substantial long-term deployment of NATO forces in the Baltic countries and Poland. Since 2014, rotational forces...
of the U.S. and other Allies have been deployed in Lithuania and other countries in the region. In 2015, NATO Force Integration Units were stood up and established in Lithuania and five other NATO nations with the responsibility to facilitate the rapid deployment of the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) and other NRF elements to the region.

In 2017, following the decision of the NATO Summit in Warsaw, four NATO Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) battalion size battlegroups were deployed in the Baltic States and Poland. Combat ready eFP forces, being fully integrated into the NATO command and control structure, make it abundantly clear that an attack against one ally is an attack against the whole Alliance. This decision has strengthened NATO deterrence and thus decreased the likelihood of military conflict in the region.

The visibility of NATO military units in the region is increasing not only on land but also at sea and in the air. While implementing the 2014 NATO security measures agreed upon at the Wales Summit, the NATO Baltic Air Policing Mission was reinforced by deploying additional QRA fighter aircraft to the Baltic countries. The long-term goal of Lithuania is to agree upon the strengthening of the NATO air defence posture in the region, including the possible transition of the NATO Air Policing Mission to an NATO Air Defence capability in case of crisis. Allied military naval vessels regularly perform various tasks in the Baltic Sea, visiting harbours of the Baltic states, and participate in exercises.

When Lithuania joined NATO, international exercises in the region were mostly of a smaller scale and oriented towards preparation for out of area operations. After Russia’s aggression against Georgia, NATO started to organise a NATO Response Force (NRF) and other NATO exercises in the Baltic states as an expression of solidarity. The number and scale of international exercises have substantially increased in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and has shifted to collective defence scenarios. International exercises sends a message that the Alliance is properly prepared to respond in case of crises, helps to enhance interoperability between the LAF and Allied forces as well as increases regional situational awareness for the Allies. Lithuania’s goal is to conduct continuous joint combat training exercises with Allies to prepare for collective defence and other tasks.
### 2. NATO collective defence capabilities

In reaction to emerging challenges, including Russia's ability to rapidly redeploy its forces to operational regions, NATO created a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF), which is the spearhead of the NATO Response Force. In case of a crisis, this force would be immediately deployed to the threatened Ally or Allies to demonstrate Allied solidarity and its political will to defend NATO members. Lithuania contributes to the VJTF on a rotational basis and strives for regular VJTF exercises to be held in the region in order to test the capacities of host nations and VJTF to act in concert. The key challenges in this area which need further improvement are the provision of Host Nation Support to the rapidly deployed VJTF units, facilitation of the speedy movement of NATO forces through and between Allied countries as well as a quick NATO decision making process.

Participating in the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), Lithuania, along with other Allies, contributes its share to the overall Alliance capability development necessary for NATO to meet its level of ambition, i.e. both for collective defence and out of area operations. As a result of the changes in the security environment, the focus of the NDPP has shifted towards enhancing high-end warfighting capabilities, such as mechanised forces and counter A2/AD capabilities. Specifically, Lithuania and other Baltic states have been encouraged to strengthen their territorial defence capabilities, to reflect their status as potential frontline Allies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Exercise</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number of troops</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Saber Strike</td>
<td>Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia</td>
<td>4500 (2300 – in Lithuania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iron Sword</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Saber Strike</td>
<td>Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia</td>
<td>6000 (3000 – in Lithuania)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BALTOPS</td>
<td>Baltic Sea</td>
<td>5600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iron Sword</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Saber Strike</td>
<td>Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia</td>
<td>10000 (5000 – in Lithuania)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BALTOPS</td>
<td>Baltic Sea</td>
<td>6000</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Iron Sword</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Iron Wolf</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>5300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Largest international exercises held in Lithuania and the Baltic states

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main purpose</th>
<th>Strategic Airlift Capability (SAC)</th>
<th>Alliance Ground Surveillance system (AGS)</th>
<th>NATO Airborne Early Warning &amp; Control System (AWACS)¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rapid transportation of personnel,</td>
<td>Ground and maritime surveillance from the air</td>
<td>Airborne command and control, air and maritime surveillance and</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>armament and equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td>battle space management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational use</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective defence and other NATO</td>
<td>Collective defence and other NATO operations, intelligence gathering and situational awareness in a theatre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>operations, rapid deployment of NATO reinforcement in case of a crisis</td>
<td></td>
<td>Collective defence and other NATO operations, surveillance and situational awareness in a theatre</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ Lithuania contributes to the operational budget only.
3. NATO’s response to hybrid threats

NATO should be prepared to act when either military or non-military means are employed in a closely coordinated manner, with the aim to destabilise the situation in a member’s territory or to test NATO solidarity. Thus, regular high level crisis management exercises serves as an opportunity for decision makers and institutions to learn how to act under different scenarios in ambiguous and uncertain environments. Another important direction is increasing the resilience of individual members and the Alliance as a whole, in order to impede the abilities of opponents to successfully use hybrid measures.

Lithuania also promotes the development of the Alliance’s competencies and capabilities in the areas of energy, cyber and information security. NATO has a role in energy security of the Allies, including critical energy infrastructure protection. At the Wales Summit, Allies agreed to integrate cyber defence into the collective defence system, while at the Warsaw Summit, cyberspace was declared the fourth domain of operations alongside land, sea and air.

“A decision as to when a cyber-attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.” Wales Summit Declaration

Lithuania likewise contributes to the development of these Allied competences and capabilities. The NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence based in Vilnius, offers expert support in the areas of energy efficient of military capabilities, critical energy infrastructure protection and situational awareness related to energy security. In addition, Lithuania is a member of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia, the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence in Latvia and the NATO Counter Intelligence Centre of Excellence in Poland.
NATO crisis management capabilities and partnerships

Lithuania plays an active role in NATO's open door partnerships policy, supporting the Alliance's efforts in promoting security and stability in the NATO neighbourhood, as well as participating in NATO operations and contributing to the development of NATO military and civilian tools for operations beyond the borders of the Alliance.

3.2. Contribution to the EU common security and defence policy

Lithuania, considering the role of NATO as the foundation for Euro-Atlantic security, supports the development of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) providing additional security guarantees. In 2016, the EU declared the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy, defining the main guidelines for CSDP development. Lithuania backs the EU initiatives that further contribute to building military capabilities in Europe, fosters the EU role providing additional security guarantees as well as the solidarity of the EU members in the area of security and defence. From Lithuania’s point of view, these initiatives have to complement NATO efforts and remain voluntary. The four directions of CSDP especially important to Lithuania are:

- Capacity to respond to hybrid threats

As EU member states face new security challenges, the EU has to be capable to provide an effective and coordinated response in this new environment by using all capabilities and instruments at its disposal. Lithuania supports the EU efforts to develop capabilities to recognise hybrid threats, increase national resilience as well as cyber and information security. Lithuania is a contributing nation to the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats based in Helsinki.
Development of the EU crisis management capabilities

The EU has to be prepared to react to crises independently, as well as in close cooperation with other international organisations. By conducting military operations and civilian missions, the EU contributes to conflict prevention and management, as well as provides assistance for increasing security capabilities of its partners. Lithuania, being part of EU operations, missions and the EU Battle Groups, not only contributes to common EU efforts, but also promotes interoperability between the LAF and the forces of other EU members which improves the preparedness to react to crises.

Cooperation with the Eastern Partnership countries

With regard to security challenges in the neighbourhood, it is important for the EU to support security and defence sector reforms of Eastern partners which are aimed at building local capacities, strengthen transparent and democratically ruled institutions and involve these countries into EU crisis management operations. Lithuania advocates for European integration of Eastern Partners (especially Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova) and in this light, strongly supports implementation of existing, as well as, encourages to initiate new EU security and defence projects in the EU Eastern Neighbourhood.

Strengthening of NATO and the EU cooperation

As both NATO and EU face the same threats and challenges, their capacities to apply different, yet complementary measures is of mutual interest. Lithuania supports the cooperation of NATO and the EU in the areas of: response to hybrid threats, military operations, capabilities development, local capacity building, defence industry and research, maritime security, cyber security and other initiatives.

3.3. Multilateral defence cooperation

Lithuania’s multilateral cooperation in the area of defence is implemented mostly in three regional cooperation formats: cooperation of the three Baltic countries, cooperation of Nordic and Baltic countries and participation in the activities of the Northern Group.
Cooperation of the three Baltic states (3B). The basis for the defence cooperation between Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia is membership in NATO and the EU, geographical proximity, similar size of the armed forces, and shared threat perception which became more tangible after the conflict in Ukraine.

Lithuania attaches a high priority to consultations on essential defence issues with the other Baltic states as well as shaping common positions in NATO and the EU. In 2013, a Non-Permanent Baltic Joint Staff Element was established with the task to exchange information relating to the security situation in the region, to analyse possible threats to the Baltic countries, to prepare contingency plans and to coordinate defence actions. The three Baltic countries closely cooperate in providing Host Nation Support to Allied forces deployed in the region. For example, the Baltic states organise regular “Baltic Host” exercises, focusing on coordinating the procedures of Host Nation Support for eventual NATO reinforcement. In February 2017, the three Baltic states agreed to simplify the procedures of the Allies’ arrival and movement within the Baltic countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The issuing of arrival and movement permits in the Baltic states since the end of 2017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Usual procedure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military units of NATO and the EU members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urgency procedure</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO eFP units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other units of NATO and the EU members</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Baltic countries regularly contribute with military units to the NATO Response Force and participates in common exercises seeking to promote the ability of Baltic states’ armed forces to coordinate their actions during crisis. Since 1998, the Baltic Naval Squadron (BALTRON) has periodically participated in the activities of the NATO Standing Naval Mine Countermeasures Group. In 2014, BALTRON became a bilateral project between Latvia and Lithuania. The Baltic Defence Co-
lege which is developed according to NATO higher military education standards, fosters the culture of defence cooperation among the three countries. The Baltic states have also developed the Baltic Air Surveillance Network and Control System (BALTNET).

**Nordic-Baltic cooperation (NB8).** Regional defence cooperation among the Nordic and Baltic countries is steadily increasing as an outcome of the close political and geographical proximity as well as the rearranging of the Baltics cooperation mechanism according to the model of Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO). Countries conduct regular Nordic-Baltic consultations on defence issues, discuss the security situation in the region and coordinate their positions regarding NATO and EU initiatives.

Lithuania seeks to promote the practical cooperation among Nordic and Baltic countries in the areas of exercises, armament acquisitions, capabilities' development and international operations. A separate area of practical cooperation is common actions in supporting Ukraine, Georgia and other countries that are conducting reforms in the security sector.

Among the Nordic countries, Denmark is a very close and long-time partner of Lithuania. The Lithuanian Mechanised infantry brigade “Iron Wolf” is affiliated with a Danish division for training purposes, while the headquarters of the brigade trains together with Danish division headquarters. The Danish military regularly participate in various exercises which are held in Lithuania.

**The Northern Group.** It is a unique multinational defence cooperation format, including NATO and the EU’s north-east region countries. Lithuania sees the Northern Group’s meetings as an opportunity to discuss various security questions with NATO Allies and partners which share a similar security mind-set. Cooperation takes place both on the political and military level and includes top level crisis management exercises.

### 3.4. Bilateral defence cooperation

Commitments by the United States of America to the security of the Baltic region, its military presence and visibility in Lithuania and in the region as a whole are one of the key security guarantees of Lithuania. The U.S., both on a bilateral and NATO basis, maintains a military presence and contributes to a credible deterrence in the Baltic region. Bilateral defence cooperation with the U.S. also includes different types of military exercises, collective and individual training and courses as well as capabilities development projects. Lithuania aims to increase the U.S. military presence in Lithuania and the region, further improve interoperability between the armed forces, enhance their preparedness for collective defence operations, maintain the U.S. financial support for the development of LAF capabilities and military infrastructure as well as participate together in international operations and missions.
The U.S. was the first Ally to reinforce NATO air policing mission and deploy its troops, armament and equipment to the Baltic states as a demonstration of solidarity and assurance in response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine in 2014.

Poland is one of the main Lithuanian allies in the area of security and defence; defence cooperation with Poland contributes to the security of Lithuania and the region as a whole. Shared threats as well as the obvious need for common actions to respond to the emerging security challenges, unites Poland and Lithuania in the field of security and defence. Both countries have the same security goals in NATO and the EU, cooperate in contingency planning and development of military capabilities. Poland also contributes to NATO's deterrence measures in the region.

The U.S. allocates funding from the Foreign Military Fund, and since 2015 – from the European Reassurance Initiative for the strengthening of the LAF capabilities.

Poland and Lithuania cooperate closely in the areas of acquisition, air defence, training and exercises. Lithuanian staff officers serve in the headquarters of the Multinational Corps Northeast located in Poland, which strengthens the regional expertise of the Alliance and provides the added capacity to develop command and control for collective defence operations. In the future, Lithuania is interested to further develop deeper ties with Poland in the defence area in order to promote

The development of the Lithuanian Polish Ukrainian brigade (LITPOLUKRBRIG) not only strengthens trilateral cooperation but also contributes to the security and stability of the region.
interoperability of Polish and Lithuanian armed forces, enhance their preparedness for defence as well as to strengthen NATO collective defence in the region.

Germany significantly contributes to NATO deterrence and defence efforts in the Baltic region. Germany is the framework nation of the battalion sized battlegroup deployed in Lithuania as part of NATO’s enhanced forward presence. This decision demonstrates Germany’s determination and commitment to the security and defence of the Baltic countries. Bilateral relations between Lithuania and Germany are extensive in the areas of acquisitions, capabilities development, exercises and training. From a long-term perspective, Lithuania strives to consolidate Germany’s involvement in regional security and defence.

The United Kingdom mainly contributes to the deterrence in the region by leading the NATO enhanced forward presence battlegroup in Estonia. Cooperation between the U.K. and Lithuania in the security and military areas has steadily increased during the last several years. Lithuania participates in several U.K.-led military projects: the Joint Expeditionary Force, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, and the NATO Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (2017). Lithuania is interested in retaining the active involvement of the U.K. in ensuring security and defence of the region.

France contributes to NATO deterrence implementation in the region. Lithuania, together with France, regularly participates in international operations, for example, in the EU maritime operation “Atalanta”, the French-led operation “Sangaris” in the Central African Republic and the United Nation’s (UN) operation “Minusma” in Mali. Close cooperation is developed in the areas of military education,
training and exercises. Lithuania promotes cooperation with France in the security and defence area and to maintain French participation in initiatives related to regional security and NATO deterrence.

Ukraine. The security and stability of Ukraine and its capacity to respond to emerging threats impacts the security of the wider region. Lithuania fully supports Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic and European integration as well as provides assistance to reforms in the security and defence sector and strengthening of defence capabilities.

In the wake of Russia’s aggressive actions in Crimea and South-Eastern Ukraine, Lithuania intensified its defence cooperation with Ukraine. Lithuania strongly supports Ukraine’s independence and territorial integrity, provides military and humanitarian aid as well as rehabilitation services in Lithuania for wounded Ukrainian troops. Lithuanian military instructors train Ukrainian Armed Forces’ units on a bilateral basis as well as together with the U.S., U.K., Canada, Poland and other Allies in various multilateral projects. Lithuanian military advisers are also involved in developing Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces, reforming the non-commissioned officers system, reorganizing military training, and developing its military police. The trilateral Lithuanian, Polish and Ukrainian brigade LITPOLUKRBRIG helps to apply NATO military standards to Ukrainian Armed Forces and increase its capacity to operate together with NATO militaries.

Lithuania intends to continue its military training and advising programmes, with the objective to enhance Ukraine’s defence capabilities, reform the security sector as well as look for ways to expand practical initiatives within the area of military cooperation.

Georgia and Moldova. Lithuania supports Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations and provides assistance in building its defence capabilities. The main areas of cooperation are – military educa-
tion and training, consultations on cyber security, strategic communications, and logistics. Troops from both countries participate together in common exercises. Lithuania actively contributes to NATO initiatives to reform and strengthen Georgia’s security and defence sector, for example, Lithuania joined the activities of the NATO-Georgia Joint Training and Evaluation Centre. Lithuania will continue to support Georgia in implementing the necessary defence sector reforms and in its efforts to modernise its armed forces.

Lithuania supports Moldova’s European integration goals and cooperation with NATO. Bilateral cooperation between Moldova and Lithuania is primarily concentrated in the areas of military training and education. Bilateral consultations are also conducted on other relevant issues like mobilisation, preparation of reserve forces, and finances. While backing Moldova’s efforts to bring its security and defence sector closer to the standards of the Euro-Atlantic community, Lithuania plans to further assist Moldova in the areas of defence reform and military training.

### 3.5. Participation in international operations

As an active and responsible member of the international community, Lithuania contributes to the efforts of maintaining peace and stability, preventing international and ethnic conflicts, solving frozen conflicts and the fight against international terrorism. Since 1994, when Lithuanian troops, for the first time ever, were deployed to an international operation in Croatia, Lithuania
continues its active participation in NATO, EU, UN, OSCE and other international operations and missions in various regions throughout the world.

Lithuania made a significant contribution to international peace and stability as well as gained invaluable experience with its participation in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan. Among these efforts, from 2005 to 2013, the Lithuania-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Ghor province, maintained a stable security environment, trained Afghan National Security Forces, supported the institutions of Afghanistan, and contributed to developing good governance, the economy, education, health care and other areas. An important part of the Lithuanian military contribution in Afghanistan was the operations of Lithuanian Special Operations Forces in the Southern part of Afghanistan.

As new threats emerged, Lithuania reoriented its involvement in international operations. Besides its role in Ukraine, Lithuania now contributes more to international operations, training and advisory missions focused on building local defence capacity in the Middle East and Africa. Lithuania is also becoming more actively involved in maritime operations, supporting the efforts of the international community to stop illegal migration in the Mediterranean Sea and to fight piracy in the Indian Ocean. This trend will most likely continue into the foreseeable future.

By participating in international operations, Lithuania, as a competent and reliable ally, contributes to a more secure environment and to the efforts of the international community to stabilise the situation in crisis regions. At the same time, Lithuanian troops gain valuable experience in operational planning and execution, civil-military cooperation, and common work with the Allies in various international settings. All experience gained in these operational environments is of vital importance for Lithuanian national defence.

- The MoND allocated about 89 million euros to PRT activities from 2005–2013.
- Approximately 2500 Lithuanian troops served in the PRT.
- Troops and civilians from Denmark, Croatia, Iceland, the U.S., Georgia, Ukraine and Japan served and worked at the PRT.
4. STRENGTHENING NATIONAL DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

4.1. Lithuanian Armed Forces: A new approach towards defence

In planning national defence, time is a factor of utmost importance. Russian permanent readiness military units can be used nearly without any early warning period under the guise of snap exercises of the Russian Armed Forces. In case of regional conflict, conventional military, covert military and/or non-military means could be used in combination, and at the same time, with the ability to deny responsibility for using them. Aggressive actions can also start as a local military incident or provocation and then escalate into a higher intensity military conflict.

In response to the changing nature of the threats, Lithuania has adopted a new defence concept. In the current security environment, the LAF have to be prepared to react immediately to any possible armed incidents even in peacetime and to transform from a peacetime to wartime structure without delay. As a result, significant changes in LAF structure as well as in its readiness, manning, training and equipping are being made.

Lithuanian Rapid Response Force: the main facts

- RRF is composed of two Land Force’s battalion groups with elements of Air Force, Navy, Special Operations Forces and other support units – 2500 troops in total.
- Readiness time – 2-24 h.
- Since 2015 annual national exercise “Thunderbolt strike” is organised with the purpose to exercise RRF as well as military-civil coordination in hybrid scenarios.

Rapid Response Force. In 2014, Lithuania established a national Rapid Response Force (RRF) whose task is to react to local armed incidents or border violations during peacetime, such as actions of irregular armed groups, illegal border crossing, violation of military transit procedures, etc.

The very high readiness state of the RRF means that the highest priority is given to manning, training, equipping and supplying these military units. Being always at a high alert standby status, the RRF would also be the first responder in case of a conventional conflict.

Reform of the LAF structure. The peacetime structure of the LAF is being expanded by standing up the motorised infantry brigade “Žemaitija”.

Use of military force in the „grey“ zone: legal aspect

- Decision to use the Armed Forces to respond to local armed incidents and border violations, which do not constitute acts of aggression, is made by the President of Lithuania.
- The area in which LAF is conducting military operation, acquires the status of military territory. The military leads operation in these territories.
- The rules of engagement are defined by the Minister of National Defence in line with the task and duration of the operation stated in the decree of the President.
As a result, two new battalions – artillery and infantry – as well as smaller combat support and combat service support units will be formed within the brigade. The headquarters and units of the “Žemaitija” brigade are located in the western part of Lithuania while the units of the Mechanized Infantry Brigade “Iron Wolf” are concentrated in the southeast of Lithuania. Hence, the two brigades, together with the territorial units of the National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF) cover the entire territory of Lithuania. In case of war, a third light infantry brigade composed of institutional training units and mobilised reservists would augment the Land Force structure.

**Mixed model of manning the LAF.** The manning of military units is an important issue in the new defence concept. In 2015, the decision to temporarily reinstate a 9 month conscription service period was taken in order to fully man military units and prepare sufficient reserves within the shortest possible time. In 2016, conscription service was made permanent. The renewal of a 9 month conscription period marks Lithuania’s transition to a mixed model for the LAF recruitment efforts: the LAF are formed from professionals, volunteer soldiers and conscripts. This model contributes to a more effective level of deterrence and a better preparedness of the society to defend the country. Taking into account the needs of national defence, as well as the capacities of the LAF and state, the possibility to transition to a universal conscription service in the medium-term will be analysed.
Reserves. Time, as the essential factor in national defence, changes the approach to the use of military reserves. As the new LAF peacetime structure is closely aligned with the wartime structure, and in the case of armed defence, reservists would mainly augment military units and replace casualties.

4.2. Branches of the Lithuanian Armed Forces and other structural units

**Land Forces**

The Land Forces are the largest and most important part of the LAF. The task of the Land Force is military security and defence of the land territory of Lithuania. Accordingly, the Land Forces have the highest priority in the defence system development plans with large scale modernisation efforts well underway.

The core capability of the Land Forces is the higher readiness "Iron Wolf" Mechanised Infantry Brigade. Its mobility, fire power, protection and other combat power elements are further being enhanced through the procurement of infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery, anti-tank and air defence systems. The National Rapid Reaction Force, consisting of two battalion-
sized groups, is generated from the brigade’s organic structure. The second Land Forces brigade – “Žemaitija” Motorised Infantry Brigade, is a lower readiness unit able to perform various operations and will be mainly composed of conscripts.

In the face of current modern threats, the National Defence Volunteer Forces have an important task for territorial defence. While preparing for this task, the NDVF closely cooperates with the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union, local communities and other non-governmental organisations. The NDVF is composed of a headquarters and six territorial units covering the entire territory of Lithuania. The main NDVF combat unit is a light infantry section which reflects the NDVF’s capability to act in an occupied territory and behind enemy lines.

| Land Force personnel, as of March 31, 2017 |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Officers        | Non-commisioned officers | Soldiers | Conscripts | Volunteer soldiers | Total |
| 530             | 1540             | 1380       | 1950        | 4720              | 10120 |

**Air Force**

The main task of the Air Force is to monitor, control and defend Lithuanian air space. Long-term plans to upgrade air surveillance and air defence capabilities will be further developed, while aerial search and rescue, as well as air transport capabilities will be maintained. Another function of the Air Force is to also provide flexible support to the Land Forces, Special Operation Forces and the Navy.

The role of the Air Force in national defence will be further enhanced with the acquisition of new short and medium range air defence systems. These projects will increase the Air Force’s capability to defend strategic objects and Land Force units from air strikes. Additionally, high priority is given to the further integration into the NATO Air and Missile Defence System as well as improving the Host Nation Support for the NATO air policing mission at Šiauliai Air Base.
Air Defense System STINGER

Transport aircraft C-27J „Spartan“

L-39 light attack aircraft

Air Force personnel, as of March 31, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Professional military servicemen</th>
<th>Conscripts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officers</td>
<td>Airmen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>270</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Air Force personnel, as of March 31, 2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure of the Air Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Air Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Surveillance and Control Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defence Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armament and Equipment Repair Depot</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The task of the Navy is the surveillance, control and defence of territorial waters as well as the surveillance and control of the Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf of Lithuania. The main and largest unit of the Navy is the Naval Flotilla, composed of the Mine Countermeasures Squadron, Patrol Ships Squadron and Auxiliary Boat Squadron.

Based on Navy surveillance capabilities, the national Integrated Sea and Coast Surveillance System connects sea and coast surveillance capabilities of different institutions into one system, which provides a comprehensive maritime picture of the Baltic Sea and Curonian Bay. The Integrated Sea and Coast Surveillance System contributes to greater situational awareness and provides relevant institutions with the ability to achieve quicker reaction times.

In the long term, Lithuania will maintain its Navy capabilities to participate in mine hunting and mine disposal operations, search and rescue, maritime pollution control operations as well as begin to modernise maritime patrol capabilities. Special attention will be given to the continued improvement of the Sea and Coast Surveillance System to ensure swift and secure information exchange amongst the various national institutions and NATO Allies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Professional military servicemen</th>
<th>Conscripts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officers</td>
<td>Sailors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Navy personnel, as of March 31, 2017

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**Structure of the Navy**

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**Vidar class command and support ship „Jotvingis“**

**Flyvefisken class patrol ship „Zemaitis“**

**Hunt class mine countermeasure ship „Skalvis“**
Special Operations Forces (SOF), distinguished for their high level of motivation, voluntary selection process and special training, are one of the four branches of the LAF. The elite troops are trained to operate in complex and dynamic environments, identify the most vulnerable areas of the adversary and perform unexpected, precise and rapid assaults. The main tasks of the SOF are special reconnaissance, direct action and military assistance.

The SOF is prepared to conduct high risk and high added value operations with the strategic and operational aims, in the political, military, economic, and information dimensions. Taking into account the lessons learnt in the Ukraine, special attention is given to the capabilities of the SOF to operate in hybrid scenarios. The SOF can also be used in cases of terrorist attacks should law enforcement agencies not possess the necessary capacities or sufficient capabilities to respond to such attacks.

The SOF are composed of four units covering all the areas critical to the success of special operations. Special Purpose Service specialises in counterterrorism operations, hostage rescue and various direct military engagements. The best operators of this unit, who successfully complete the
long and rigorous training, receive the right to wear the “Žaliukas” badge. This is a continuation of traditions from the post-war Lithuanian guerrilla resistance who fought against the aggression and occupation of the Soviet Union. Vytautas the Great Jaeger Battalion provides support to combat units during special operations and performs special reconnaissance and surveillance. The Combat Divers Service also performs special reconnaissance and combat actions both on land and in water, executes naval boarding actions, containment and escort operations and provides military assistance. The Training and Combat Support Centre is responsible for the selection and training of SOF soldiers, maintaining the lessons learned process as well the introduction and application of new innovations and technologies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Special Operations Forces</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Purpose Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vytautas the Great Jaeger Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Divers Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training and Combat Support Centre</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Structure of the Special Operations Forces
Logistics Command

The task of the Logistics Command and its subordinate units is to provide logistic support to LAF units and Allied forces deployed in Lithuania. The main subordinate unit of the Logistics Command is the Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytenis Main Support Logistics Battalion located in Marijampolė. In the changed security environment, the priorities of the Logistics Command and its units have also shifted: from international operations to national defence planning and logistic support to the ever increasing numbers of LAF and Allied troops stationed in Lithuania.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logistics Command and its subordinate units</th>
<th>Professional military servicemen</th>
<th>Conscripts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytenis Main Support Logistics Battalion</td>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officers</td>
<td>Soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr. Jonas Basanavičius Military Medical Service</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Depot Storage Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Material Resources Department</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Control Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garrison Base Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Cartographic Centre</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistics Command personnel, as of March 31, 2017

Hybrid Energy Generation & Management System developed with funding from Canada and delivered to the LAF by the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence
The task of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and its subordinate units is to implement the military training policy and train Lithuanian Armed Forces personnel. TRADOC provides individual soldier and unit training, organises training for National Defence System personnel, arranges training areas and other training aids for military units, as well as provides simulation systems and develops LAF doctrine documents. With regard to the needs of the armed national defence, and in case of mobilisation, a brigade sized unit would be formed from TRADOC institutional units and trained reserves. The main challenges of TRADOC are the efficient support to national and international exercises as well as individual and collective training, training of conscripts and developing the capability to form a light infantry brigade.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training and Doctrine Command and its subordinate units</th>
<th>Professional military servicemen</th>
<th>Conscripts</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>Non-commissioned officers</td>
<td>Soldiers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Training and Doctrine Command personnel, as of March 31, 2017
4.3. Personnel of the Lithuanian Armed Forces

Properly prepared, equipped and motivated troops are one of the most essential components of any military power. The increase of personnel, sufficient manning of units and effective combat training are the main priority directions of the LAF development. The primary increase in personnel is planned within the Land Forces, with existing and newly established units to be manned up to 75-90%. These personnel numbers are necessary to conduct effective collective training and prepare for all foreseen operational tasks.

Professional military servicemen, who chose military service as a profession, form the core of the LAF. They are the best trained and have the most opportunities for career advancement and military occupation specialisation. For a long time, the number of professional military servicemen was around 8,000; however, a substantial growth of this core group is foreseen in future personnel development plans.

Mandatory Military Service allows for a larger share of the population to perform their military duty and acquire initial military training. Currently, young men and women can fulfil their Mandatory Military Service in two ways: as a conscript for 9 months or by participating in the Junior Officers’ Commander training course. Presently, plans are in place to call up about 4,000 conscripts each year during 2018-2019. The future number of conscripts will depend on which conscription model is chosen and the capacities of the LAF in terms of logistics, infrastructure and training personnel.

Currently, conscripts are called up according to a randomly computer generated list compiled annually, and composed of 19-26 year old men. However, both men and women are encouraged to sign up voluntarily. All conscripts receive a monthly allowance of €140 euros for personal expenses. Additionally, and after completion of service, each conscript receives an accumulative payment, whose size depends on the evaluation of their time in service as well as on whether a conscript signed up voluntarily.
Conscripts not only significantly augment the LAF’s structure (20% of all the LAF) but also constitute a manning source for the professional military service as it is planned that about 15-20% of all conscripts will stay in the LAF as professionals.

Mandatory Military Service can also be accomplished by enrolling into a Junior Officers’ Commander training course. It is an opportunity for students and graduates of higher education institutions to acquire a reserve lieutenant’s rank during a period of three years. Students learn military theory during weekends and apply it in practice during field exercises which are organised during summer vacations and last about two weeks.

Volunteer soldiers serving in the National Defence Volunteer Forces (NDVF) are an important part of the LAF, which constitutes about 25-30% of all personnel. Volunteer soldiers participate in international operations, assist civilian institutions during natural disasters and catastrophes, and in the case of a threat against Lithuania, are prepared to perform territorial defence tasks and support Allied forces. Service in the NDVF is not permanent but is designed as much as possible around the volunteer’s civilian job duties or students’ studies. It is a flexible way for Lithuanian citizens to participate in national defence.
Professional military servicemen and volunteer soldiers

- Professional training, qualification improvement and education opportunities
- Meal and travelling allowances
- Onetime monetary allowance for first 4 years of uninterrupted military service
- Rewards for distinguished service
- Social insurance benefits
- Health care service and psychological support 24/7
- Social and psychological support for family members of troops deployed to international operations

Growing defence expenditures, allows defence planners to plan for an increase of military personnel; however, demographic tendencies may require personnel manning plans to be reassessed for alternative solutions in the future. In this light, the increase of salaries by 30% for professional military service members is planned during 2017-2020. Additionally, non-financial motiva-
tion measures such as investing into the social welfare of the military have to be implemented. Furthermore, the term of professional military service is being prolonged to enhance the attractiveness of service and to allow the LAF to retain high quality competencies.

**Military reserves.** The reserve component is composed of former professional military servicemen, volunteer soldiers and conscripts. In the short-term, the main source of the reserve formation will be from conscripts who finished their 9 months mandatory service and decided not to become professional military servicemen.

The core of the reserves is made up of retired soldiers who finished their service or refreshment training within the past 5 years, that is, those who retain skills acquired in service and are able to augment military units in case of a crisis without the need for extended refresher training.

### 4.4. Modernisation of the Lithuanian Armed Forces

As a result of increasing defence expenditures, a large scale modernisation effort of the LAF is being implemented. In the medium term, Lithuania will allocate no less than 25% of the overall defence budget towards the modernisation of the LAF. In total, more than €2.5 billion euros will be spent for the acquisition of armament, military equipment and stockpiling of ammunition during 2017-2022. The largest segment of the modernisation plans are allocated to the Land Forces with the priority going to the “Iron Wolf” brigade. Capabilities of the Air Force, Navy, SOF and Logistics will be maintained and developed according to the operational needs of the LAF.

The 2016 procurement of Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFVs) is the largest investment project ever undertaken since the restoration of independence in 1990. Two battalions of the “Iron Wolf” Brigade will be equipped with the modern wheeled “Boxer” infantry fighting vehicles armed with a 30 mm automatic cannon and “Spike” anti-tank missiles. The new IFVs will allow the LAF to conduct more sophisticated operations as well as significantly increase manoeuvre and firepower capabilities.

Lithuania is also acquiring the 155 mm self-propelled “PzH2000” howitzers from Germany with the goal to significantly increase fire support capabilities. This project expands the effective firing range of the LAF up to 40 km. Additionally, plans to procure long-range anti-tank systems,
which together with the current stocks of medium range “Javelin” anti-tank systems, will further boost the capacities of the LAF to fight against various types of armoured vehicles.

The development of air surveillance and air defence capabilities is also a top priority. The national air surveillance system is an integral part of the NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defence System (NATINAMDS). Long-range air defence radars as well as short-range and gap-filler radars are being procured. Additionally, Lithuania is updating its short-range air defence inventory by acquiring the GROM man-portable short range air defence systems. In order to achieve a medium range ground based air defence capability, i.e. to be capable of engaging air targets at the height of up to 15 km, Lithuania is procuring NASAMS air defence systems.

Additionally, so as to improve the combat effectiveness and protection of troops on the battlefield, a substantial share of resources are allocated for the acquisition of individual armament and equipment, including sniper rifles, precision rifles and individual soldier protection equipment.

Investing in better situational awareness and early warning, strategic, operational and tactical intelligence capabilities are further enhanced with the provisioning of special equipment to various LAF components, which helps to increase cooperation among national institutions and with Allies.

Two additional vital areas slated for modernisation are communications and transportation. The LAF is being equipped with modern, robust communications equipment for command and control at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, achieving interoperability both within the LAF and with Allies. Major investments plans are also approved in order to increase the mobility of the LAF with tracked and wheeled vehicles.

### Infrastructure

The growing size of the LAF, together with newly procured armament and equipment, and a strong Allied presence on Lithuania soil, means there is an increasing demand on infrastructure for combat training, relocation of new units, maintenance facilities, storage, and Host Nation Support. Accordingly, military infrastructure is also being renovated and expanded with major investments in this area and which will reach more than €200 million euros in 2017-2022. It must also be noted that infrastructure projects are also funded by the NATO Security Investment Programme and the U.S. European Reassurance Initiative (ERI). While developing infrastructure, energy efficiency will be sought after by exploring all possibilities to use renewable energy resources.

The main directions of infrastructure development:

- adapting infrastructure to the changes in the LAF structure: establishment of new units, relocation of current units, storage of new equipment and armament;
- improving accommodation and recreation facilities for conscripts;
- expanding training infrastructure for national and Allied troops;
- improving Host Nation Support infrastructure for Allied forces – barracks, storage and logistics service infrastructure, development of Lithuanian Air Force Air Base.
While improving combat training infrastructure, the training areas are expanded, their infrastructure is renovated, new training fields are established. Qualitative changes are planned in five military training areas located in Pabradė, Gaižiūnai, Kairiai, Kazlų Rūda and Rokai. The highest priority is given to two training areas of national importance – General Silvestras Žukauskas Training Area in Pabradė and Gaižiūnai Training Area.

**General Silvestras Žukauskas Training Area**

The main training area of the LAF is expanded from 85 to 176 sq. km. New tactical areas are formed for manoeuvring as well as tank and infantry fighting vehicles firing ranges. New individual firing ranges and positions are installed. Military infrastructure is also being developed by building new barracks, modernising mess halls, installing equipment maintenance and repair workshops. All these projects will create better conditions for the training of battalion sized battle groups with support units (artillery, mortars, anti-tank and air defence systems, aviation).

**Urban warfare training facility**

The only urban warfare training centre in the Baltic states is located at the Pabradė Training Area and is designed solely to train for operations in urban areas. The newly built infrastructure resembles a small town (26 buildings) in order to create conditions as close to a real urban environment as possible.

**Gaižiūnai Training Area**

Training area doubles – from 52 to 125 sq. km. in order to accommodate company-sized units with support elements. Firing positions for various types of infantry weapons are being installed, including for artillery and mortars.

**Brigade General Kazys Veverskis (Kazlų Rūda) Training Area**

By the end of 2017 an air to ground firing range will be installed for close air support trainings.
4.5. Wartime Armed Forces

In case of war, the nation is defended by the Wartime Armed Forces which consists of the LAF, institutions from the Internal Affairs system (Public Security Service, the VIP Protection Department and the State Border Guard Service), combat units of the LRU and armed resistance units of citizens. The Wartime Armed Forces are led by the Chief of the Wartime Armed Forces (Chief of Defence of Lithuania) who is subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces (President of Lithuania).

The State Armed Defence Concept, which is approved by the State Defence Council (chaired by the President, members include: the Parliament speaker, Prime Minister, Chief of Defence, and Minister of National Defence), provides the guidelines for the tasks of the Wartime Armed Forces, while armed defence operational plans define the more specific actions to be taken.

When planning and conducting national defence engagements during direct armed aggression, the specifics of each institution and their peacetime tasks would be taken into consideration.

During peacetime, the main responsibility for the equipping and training of the Wartime Armed Forces belongs to each institution respectively. The main task of the LAF is to define the mandatory minimum requirements for the Wartime Armed Forces as well as to promote interoperability between the institutions and units. The organisations who make-up the Wartime Armed Forces, participate in regular exercises organised by the LAF in order to improve their abilities to work together, shoulder to shoulder, under a single command.

4.6. Peacetime tasks of the Lithuanian Armed Forces

During peacetime, the LAF provides assistance to civilian institutions in cases where these institutions do not have sufficient organic capabilities to deal with the emergency situation. The range of circumstances when LAF assistance could be required and provided is wide: from assisting
police in the search of missing persons to the stopping of a terrorist act. In practice, assistance from the LAF is usually required during natural disasters (e.g. floods and fires), air medical evacuation or the rapid transport of donated organs. The LAF also have specific peacetime tasks primarily search and rescue and pollution control in the Baltic Sea.

In peacetime, LAF organic support forces are responsible for providing assistance to other institutions. These forces are composed of Land Force units, helicopters, ships, military engineers, logisticians, medics and other specialists who are on duty on a rotational basis. It is worth mentioning that search and rescue operations in the Baltic Sea, the Curonian Lagoon and waters of the Klaipėda Port are also coordinated by the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre of the Navy. In addition, the LAF further contributes to increasing the safety of the state's territory through the neutralisation of ammunition and explosives (EOD) left after past wars.

- Search and rescue statistics 2009–2016:
  - total number of events – 492
  - search and rescue operations conducted – 205
  - persons saved – 695
5. RESILIENCE OF THE STATE AND SOCIETY

5.1. National defence and society

In general, a strong civil society, contributing to national defence and national security, is one of the most important guarantees to safeguard the independence of the state. With this in mind and due to the changed security environment, the National Defence System implements a number of activities designed to encourage, educate and motivate citizens to defend the state, to fight for the nation’s independence as well as increase their knowledge and skills for both non-violent and armed resistance.

The Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union. The LRU is a state supported voluntary civil defence association, which plays an important role in civil preparedness for national defence. Within the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, the LRU demonstrated itself as an increasingly influential organisation – with the number of riflemen growing by almost 40%, indicating the desire of citizens from all walks of life to contribute to national defence in wake of the emerging security challenges faced by the nation.
The National Defence System aims to integrate the LRU deeper into national defence in order to fully use the available potential of this organisation. In case of aggression, the LRU, consisting of citizens possessing a wide-range of experience and skills sets, would be a central hub of civil defence in order to involve and organise other associations, as well as local communities, into a non-violent civil resistance movement. Additionally, the LRU has an important role in preparing its members for armed resistance. In peacetime, LRU combat units consisting of riflemen with basic military training are affiliated with the NDVF and other LAF military units in order to ensure the most effective combat training and interoperability possible. Other riflemen with military training would be able to join the guerrilla movement in occupied territories. Furthermore, riflemen are also trained to provide support to the armed forces for other defence tasks like the protection of critical infrastructure, logistic support, and information collection and dissemination. The riflemen use LAF infrastructure, are also trained by military instructors and participate in LAF exercises.

Civic and patriotic education of the young riflemen (11-18 years old) is another central activity of the LRU. In addition to various civic initiatives, young riflemen receive some basic theoretical and practical knowledge about national defence, which also provides for a potential source of young people who may be willing to choose a military career.

**Civic and patriotic education.** The National Defence System also devotes attention to youth patriotic education which covers national security and defence policy, the Lithuanian Armed
Forces and military service. The Ministry of National Defence likewise funds summer camps for young riflemen which are organised annually by the Lithuanian Riflemen’s Union. High school students are also invited to participate in events arranged for National Defence Day, which are held in different LAF units. During Civil Defence Days, the Ministry of National Defence also organises visits to schools. Furthermore, various events, festivals and open days during international military exercises are organised to further help develop closer cooperation between society and the LAF. Similarly, the Ministry of National Defence cooperates with non-governmental organisations through partially funding projects, which cultivate and increase the public’s motivation and desire to defend the state.

In this context, higher priority is given to ethnic minority communities and the more vulnerable regions of the country, i.e. those areas where, according to various studies, civic activities, interest in national defence and military service, resilience to information threats are not as strong. In these regions, representatives from the National Defence System deliver presentations on information security, national defence and civil resistance, organises open door days at military units, holds different family friendly and community events as well as encourages the public to participate in LRU activities.

The public can also find additional information on their role in national defence in several publications recently released by the Ministry of National Defence: “What we should know about in preparing for emergency and war situations”, “Prepare to survive emergencies and war: a cheerful take on serious recommendations”, and “What we should know about resistance: the guidance for active actions”. In these publications, the reader can find comprehensive information on what actions state institutions would take in case of emergencies and war, how the public should act during these cases, as well as security and safety recommendations and how the public can contribute to national defence.

5.2. Information security

The freedom to express one’s personal convictions is a fundamental constitutional value of Lithuania. However, this right is deliberately exploited to organise information attacks against
Lithuania, in which the perpetrator(s) seeks to incite discord or hate, falsify the history of the country, weaken the trust of the public in the state and NATO Allies. In fact, Russia conducts deliberate information campaigns targeting Lithuanian society using a broad array of means: from television to social media.

In response, the National Defence System takes direct actions in four ways so as to increase the resilience of society and limit the impact of the information attacks. Firstly, the LAF Strategic Communications Department monitors and analyses the information domain to determine the targets, the scale and means of the information attacks. LAF experts also assist the Lithuanian Radio and Television Commission so that the spread of such information can be stopped by statutory means.

The second way is through outreach. The National Defence System conducts a wide range of public education campaigns to help increase society’s resilience to information attacks. Each year, LAF strategic communications experts deliver more than 200 presentations to schools, municipalities, state institutions, local communities, cultural, business and other non-governmental organisations across Lithuania. During these presentations, experts explain how to recognise and deconstruct the propaganda and other information attacks. The National Defence System also supports civic initiatives contributing to the public education campaign on increasing information security.
The third means to limiting the effects of information attacks is by explaining the benefits of being a NATO Ally. The success of the NATO Enhanced Forward Presence mission is related to the public support for the presence of Allied forces in Lithuania. In this regard, the National Defence System is taking proactive steps to inform society about the benefits of NATO Allies’ presence in Lithuania including deepening the public’s understanding about NATO’s collective defence commitments.

The final way the National Defence System fights against these attacks, is through the promotion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation with NATO and EU institutions and member states that face similar challenges, through the sharing of its best practices, experiences and lessons learned from the attacks in this information domain.

5.3. Cyber security

Cyber espionage and other attacks are conducted by terrorist or criminal organisations, state and/or state-supported hackers, in order to disrupt vitally important functions and sectors (e.g. governmental communication, financial services or energy supply), get access to classified information or receive financial or political gain. Moreover, cyber-attacks are becoming more sophisticated and harder to detect.

The National Defence System is one of the main targets of cyber-attacks. The number of cyber incidents directed against the National Defence System now reaches thousands per year. Cyber espionage of networks, scanning for vulnerabilities, and attempts to disrupt information systems and internet sites are regularly detected.

In 2015, the Ministry of National Defence became responsible for the shaping and implementation of cyber security policy in Lithuania. The National Cyber Security Centre under the auspices of Ministry of National Defence was established and tasked with the cyber security of state institutions and critical information infrastructure. The Cyber Security Council was founded as a
Establishing requirements, standards, recommendations and supervising their implementation

Education, analysis, informing

Installing early detection and warning systems and software

Monitoring information systems

Capacity to detect and identify various types of cyber incidents and attacks

Consulting on and reacting to cyber incidents and attacks

Coordinating response to a large scale attack

Recovering information systems and their data

Evaluating incidents and attacks and providing recommendations on how to increase resilience of information systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prevention</th>
<th>Detection</th>
<th>Response</th>
<th>Recovery</th>
<th>Evaluation and analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establishing requirements, standards, recommendations and supervising their implementation</td>
<td>Installing early detection and warning systems and software</td>
<td>Consulting on and reacting to cyber incidents and attacks</td>
<td>Recovering information systems and their data</td>
<td>Evaluating incidents and attacks and providing recommendations on how to increase resilience of information systems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Network Management and Cyber Defence Module is developed in the Lithuanian Grand Duke Gediminas Staff Battalion.

body for coordinating efforts among private and public sectors as well as providing recommendations on how to improve cyber security in Lithuania. The primary concept of the reform was to move towards more centralised responsibilities, pooled resources and better coordination – the direction, which will continue into the coming years.

The highest priority is given to the implementation of prevention, detection and response measures in state institutions and critical information infrastructure, so as to increase their resilience to cyber threats. With this in mind, cyber security monitoring systems and cyber security regulations will be further developed. Lithuania organises annual national cyber security exercises involving representatives from academic, public and private sectors to increase the national capability to detect and resist cyber-attacks.
The LAF develops cyber defence capabilities to deal with the cyber-attacks directed against military communications and information systems and assists the National Cyber Security Centre if needed. The cyber defence exercise “Amber Mist” is organised on an annual basis, with elements of cyber defence being included in different military exercises. Lithuania also participates in international cyber defence exercises and is a founding member of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence.

As cyber threats are considered a long-term challenge to national security, further development of national capabilities to prevent and respond to various attacks in cyberspace will remain a key task of the National Defence System.

5.4. Mobilisation and Host Nation Support

Mobilisation – is the comprehensive reorganisation of the state and concentration of resources for national defence, performing the vital functions of the state and/or fulfilling international commitments. Mobilisation is declared when the need arises to defend the country or fulfil international commitments, e.g. in the case of collective defence, if another NATO member is under armed attack.

The Host Nation Support mechanism is also incorporated into the national mobilisation system. Host Nation Support encompasses civilian and military assistance which during peacetime or crisis, is rendered to Allied forces deployed in Lithuania.

Mobilisation is declared by the Seimas (Lithuanian Parliament) upon submission by the President, and in case of armed attack – by the President unilaterally. The mobilisation declaration is immediately made public through the media, without delay.

Preparation for mobilisation is an important peacetime task, although the real needs in case of war may be difficult to project. While preparing for mobilisation during peacetime:

- mobilisation and Host Nation Support tasks are assigned to institutions;
- mobilisation plans are developed and preparations made to implement them;
- personnel are trained;
- supplies are stocked in advance or the use of other resources during mobilisation is planned;
- agreements on mobilisation orders are signed with business entities.

**MOBILISATION PLANS**

- National Mobilisation Plan
- MoD Mobilisation Plan
- Wartime Armed Forces Mobilisation Plan
- Joint Mobilisation Plan of Civilian Mobilisation Institutions

**Changes in mobilisation concept**

Modern conflicts demand that the national mobilisation system is prepared to react very quickly. Time for mobilisation could be counted not in days but hours.
All state institutions participating in the mobilisation system are responsible for the preparation to fulfil their mobilisation tasks, including the planning of necessary resources, while national defence institutions have a coordinating role.

The effectiveness of the national mobilisation system, including the mobilisation plans of civilian institutions, is tested during regularly scheduled exercises. Lithuania initiated a review of the national mobilisation system with the goal of increasing its flexibility and speed in case of contingency.

### Duties of citizens during mobilisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RESERVIST</th>
<th>After the announcement of universal total mobilisation, reservists who have basic military training are called up to military service and have to report to a territorial unit of the Conscription Administration and Recruitment Service.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>After the announcement of partial mobilisation, reservists are called up only if it is proclaimed in the mobilisation announcement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIVILIAN MOBILISATION PERSONNEL RESERVE</td>
<td>Citizens, who are needed to implement measures defined in the mobilisation plans, are included in the civilian mobilisation personnel reserve, usually in the same institution in which they worked before mobilisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER CITIZENS</td>
<td>who do not have mobilisation or Host Nation Support tasks, continue their work and usual activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>